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Abstract: Deterministic public-key encryption, encrypting a plaintext into a unique
ciphertext without involving any randomness, was introduced by Bellare, Boldyreva,
and O’Neill (CRYPTO 2007) as a realistic alternative to some inherent drawbacks in
randomized public-key encryption. Bellare, Kiltz, Peikert and Waters (EUROCRYP-
T 2012) bring deterministic public-key encryption to the identity-based setting, and
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propose deterministic identity-based encryption scheme (DIBE). Although the con-
structions of chosen plaintext attack (CPA) secure DIBE scheme have been studied
intensively, the construction of chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure DIBE scheme
is still challenging problems. In this paper, we introduce the notion of identity-based
all-but-one trapdoor functions (IB-ABO-TDF), which is an extension version of all-
but-one lossy trapdoor function in the public-key setting. We give a instantiation of
IB-ABO-TDF under decisional linear assumption. Based on an identity-based lossy
trapdoor function and our IB-ABO-TDF, we present a generic construction of CCA-
secure DIBE scheme.
Key Words: deterministic identity-based encryption, identity-based lossy trapdoor
functions, identity-based all-but-one trapdoor functions, chosen ciphertext security
Category: C.2.0, D.4.6, E.3
1 Introduction
The semantic security for public key encryption requires that the encryption al-
gorithm must be a random process. This creates a significant performance bottle-
neck if, for example, one wants to perform fast search over many encrypted data
items. To address this issue, Bellare, Boldyreva, and O’Neill [Bellare et al. 2007]
first introduced the notion of deterministic public-key encryption (DPKE), in
which the encryption algorithm does not use randomness, i.e., its encryption
algorithm is required to be a deterministic function of the message. The mo-
tivating application of deterministic PKE is to perform fast search over many
encrypted data items. The technique is more effective in scenarios where frequent
search queries are performed over a huge database of unpredictable data item-
s. Deterministic encryption permits logarithmic time search on encrypted data,
while randomized encryption only allows linear time search, meaning a search
requires scanning the whole database. Moreover, since deterministic encryption
does not use randomness, it is an important class of PKE dealing with the
subsequently revealed problem of randomness subversion [Bellare et al. 2009].
The DPKE is used as a building block of hedged PKE [Bellare et al. 2015b,
Boldyreva et al. 2017] and nonce-based PKE [Huang et al. 2018], which achieve
best possible security in the face of bad randomness.
Because the encryption algorithm of DPKE is a deterministic process, of
course deterministic public key encryption cannot satisfy the meaningful notion
of security of randomized public key encryption. Bellare et al. [Bellare et al. 2007]
provided the “strongest possible” notion of security for this primitive, called
PRIV, which can be realized for relatively high-entropy plaintext distributions.
Constructions of DPKE schemes satisfying the notions of security were proposed
in the random oracle model by Bellare et al. [Bellare et al. 2007]. Later, Bellare
et al. [Bellare et al. 2008] and Boldyreva et al. [Boldyreva et al. 2008] refined
and extended the security notion and presented constructions in the standard
model. Especially, Boldyreva et al. [Boldyreva et al. 2008] gave general construc-
tions of both CPA and CCA secure deterministic public key encryption schemes
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which are based on lossy trapdoor functions (LTDF) [Peikert et al. 2008]. They
showed that any LTDF is a deterministic PKE scheme which is PRIV-secure for
high min-entropy block-sources (namely, each message to be encrypted has high
min-entropy given the other messages) as long as the lossy mode acts as a uni-
versal hash function. Emerging as a practically-motivated notion of theoretical
depth and interest, several significant foundational works then further investi-
gated security for deterministic encryption and presented standard model con-
structions [Brakerski et al. 2011, Mironov et al. 2012, Raghunathan et al.2013,
O’Neill 2010, Cui et al. 2014, Zhang et al. 2014, Wee 2012, Bellare et al. 2015a,
Fuller et al. 2012, Koppula et al. 2016].
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a public key encryption that enables one
to encrypt a message using a recipient’s identity, rather than its public key.
It simplifies public key and certificate distribution and management and thus
has a wide range of applications [Yu et al. 2017, Li et al. 2019]. Due to the in-
herent advantage of IBE, Bellare, Kiltz, Peikert and Waters [Bellare et al. 2012]
extended the notion of deterministic encryption into the identity-based setting.
They proposed a CPA-secure deterministic identity-based encryption (DIBE)
scheme by first constructing identity-based lossy trapdoor function (IB-LTDF).
The DIBE allows quickly logarithmic-time searchable identity-based encryption
of database entries while maintaining the maximal possible privacy. Later, Escala
et al. [Escala et al. 2014] provided an alternative definition of partial lossiness of
IB-LTDF and constructed a hierarchical identity-based lossy trapdoor functions
(HIB-LTDF), based on which they achieved DHIBE scheme for block-sources,
this DHIBE scheme is secure against chosen plaintext attack (CPA). After that,
several follow-up works [Xie et al. 2012, Fang et al. 2016, Zhang et al. 2017] fur-
ther investigated security of DIBE and presented CPA-secure DIBE schemes
from the hardness of learning with error (LWE) problem. So far, existing DIBE
schemes only achieve chosen-plaintext security.
Security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) is a de facto se-
curity notion for public-key encryption in practice. Active adversary might also
obtain the decryption of ciphertexts under any identity of its choice. Thus it is
necessary to consider the stronger security notion of DIBE, i.e., PRIV-ID-CCA
security (we will explain it in section 2). Inspired by CHK transformation ap-
proach [Canetti et al. 2004] in randomized PKE, which converts IND-ID-CPA
secure 2-level hierarchical IBE to IND-ID-CCA secure IBE using a strongly un-
forgeable one-time signature. The natural idea is to adapt this approach to the
deterministic encryption. That is to say, one can construct PRIV-CCA-secure
deterministic IBE based on a PRIV-CPA-secure 2-level deterministic HIBE. Un-
fortunately, we observe that it is not natural to do so. Since in the determinis-
tic setting, the strongly unforgeable one-time signature is replaced by a target
collision-resistant hash function of the plaintext. Similarly, following CHK trans-
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formation, the hope is that the proof tries to reduce the security of deterministic
IBE against adaptive chose-ciphertext attacks to that of the 2-level selective-id
secure deterministic HIBE against chose-plaintext attacks. That is, the reduction
attempts to determine which message was actually encrypted in deterministic
IBE with the help of an adversary who breaks the deterministic HIBE. The anal-
ysis from CHK transformation, however, does not quite work since it crucially
relies on the fact that the plaintexts corresponding to the challenge ciphertexts
are chosen by the adversary in randomized encryption setting. While, in the
deterministic encryption setting, the plaintexts corresponding to the challenge
ciphertexts are not chosen by the adversary, such that the challenger cannot
perform the simulations. For the above reasons, in this paper, we attempt to
construct a deterministic IBE scheme which can achieve CCA security.
1.1 Our contributions
Identity-Based All-But-One TDFs. In STOC’08 [Peikert et al. 2008], Peikert and
Waters introduced a new powerful primitive called lossy trapdoor functions
(LTDF) and a richer abstraction called all-but-one trapdoor functions (ABO-
TDF). LTDF operates in one of two possible “mode”, an injective one and an
un-invertible lossy one, for which the outputs are indistinguishable. ABO-TDF
is a generalization of the LTDF whose first input is drawn from a set of branch-
es, one of which is lossy. Freeman et al. [Freeman et al. 2010] generalized the
definition of ABO-TDF by allowing possibly many lossy branches (other than
one).
We introduce the notion of identity-based all-but-one trapdoor functions (IB-
ABO-TDF), which is an extension of all-but-one trapdoor functions (ABO-TDF)
in the public key setting. As for identity-based ABO-TDF, which is essential-
ly specific ABO-TDF whose identity set can be viewed as the set of branch-
es, each function has many lossy branches just as the generalized definition
in [Freeman et al. 2010], but each branch is now represented by a pair of (id, b).
The first component id is the user’s identity, and the second component b is the
tag. That is to say, the IB-ABO-TDF can be viewed as a specific ABO-TDF
with the set of branch IDSp×TagSp, where IDSp is identity space and TagSp is
tag space. The lossy identity id and the lossy tag b determine together the lossy
branch. Lossy identities are determined by a auxiliary input which is hidden in
the public parameters. The security requires that it is computationally indistin-
guishable to tell a lossy branch from an injective branch. Meanwhile, given a
lossy branch, it is hard to find one-more lossy branches without the trapdoor.
Based on the basic IBE scheme of Bellare et al. [Bellare et al. 2012], we
present a concrete construction of IB-ABO-TDF, and its security is proved in
the selective-id security model based on the hardness of decisional linear Diffie-
Hellman assumption (DLIN assumption). In our construction, each identity func-
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tion takes as input (mpk, id, b, x), where mpk is public parameter, id is identity,
b is branch and x is the input value, and outputs a ciphertext, which is a matrix
encryption of the basic IBE scheme.
CCA-secure deterministic IBE. Based on an IB-LTDF and our IB-ABO-
TDF, we present a generic construction of CCA-secure deterministic identity-
based encryption scheme in the standard model. Its security is proved under
the selective-id security model. In this paper, we stick to the original setting
of Bellare et al. [Bellare et al. 2007] and require that the plaintext distribu-
tions can not depend on the master public key of the system. In the case
of block-sources [Boldyreva et al. 2008], Boldyreva et al. proved that PRIV1-
security (i.e., for single-message challenge security) is equivalent to PRIV-security
(i.e., for multi-message challenge security) in the sense of indistinguishability-
based definitions. In this work, we follow the simplified indistinguishability-based
notion, called PRIV1-IND as introduced in [Boldyreva et al. 2008].
Our construction of DIBE scheme builds on the framework of Boldyreva
et al. [Boldyreva et al. 2008] for constructing CCA-secure deterministic PKE
scheme in the standard model. In our construction, the deterministic encryp-
tion algorithm E(id, b,m), where id is identity, b is branch and m is the mes-
sage, requires to find a deterministic method to sample the branch. Follow-
ing [Boldyreva et al. 2008], let b = Htcr(m), where Htcr is a universal and target
collision-resistant hash function. If message m has sufficient entropy, the branch
looks random due to the Leftover Hash Lemma [Dodis et al. 2004]. The differ-
ences are, in the identity-based setting, the simulator must answer the decryp-
tion queries for any identity (including the challenge identity) from adversary.
Because the branch is a pair (id, b), let (id∗, b∗) be the lossy branch, only if
the branch (id, b) 6= (id∗, b∗), with overwhelming probability, the identity-based
ABO-TDF works as an injective trapdoor function. Therefore, the simulator
can answer the adversary’s decryption queries corresponding to the challenge
identity as long as b 6= b∗.
1.2 Related work
Bellare et al. introduced the notion of deterministic identity-based encryption
in [Bellare et al. 2012]. They constructed an identity-based lossy trapdoor func-
tions (IB-LTDF) from pairing and built a DIBE scheme with selective-id security
as an application of IB-LTDF. Soon afterwards, Escala et al. [Escala et al. 2014]
introduced the notion of hierarchical identity-based lossy trapdoor functions
(HIB-LTDF), based on which they constructed deterministic hierarchical identity-
based encryption scheme (DHIBE) from pairings. In [Xie et al. 2012], Xie et al.
considered deterministic identity-based public key encryption in the auxiliary-
input setting and proposed a DIBE scheme from lattices that is adaptively
secure. Fang et al. [Fang et al. 2016] constructed a selective-id secure DHIBE
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scheme based on the hardness of learning with rounding over small modu-
lus [Bogdanov et al. 2016]. In fact, a selective-id secure DHIBE implies a DIBE
with a selective security. Recently, Zhang et al. [Zhang et al. 2017] constructed
an adaptive secure DIBE scheme with shorter public parameters from partition-
ing function [Yamada et al. 2017] under the learning with error assumption.
Below we compare our construction with the related works [Xie et al. 2012,
Fang et al. 2016, Zhang et al. 2017] in terms of property and security in Table
1. The second column shows whether the scheme is constructed in a generic
way. The third to fifth column show the security, the adversary type and the
underlying assumption for guaranteeing the security. It can be learnt from Table
1 that only our scheme achieves chosen ciphertext security.
Scheme Generic security level Adversary type Assumption
[Bellare et al. 2012]
√
CPA selective-id DLIN
[Xie et al. 2012] × CPA adaptive-id LWE
[Escala et al. 2014]
√
CPA adaptive-id DBDH+DDH
[Fang et al. 2016] × CPA selective-id LWR
[Zhang et al. 2017] × CPA adaptive-id LWE
Our scheme
√
CCA selective-id DLIN
Table 1: Comparison of performance
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review some
standard notions and cryptographic definitions. We introduce the notion of IB-
ABO-TDF and present a concrete construction of IB-ABO-TDF in section 3.
In section 4, we propose a generic construction of CCA-secure DIBE scheme
based on our IB-ABO-TDF and an IB-LTDF. Finally, we state our conclusion
in section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We use uppercase Roman letters A, B,. . . to represent sets, lowercase Roman
letters to elements of a set x ∈ X, and bold to vectors x ∈ Xn. Bold uppercase
letters A = [aij ] represents matrices of scalars. If x is a vector, then |x| denotes
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the number of its coordinates and x[i] denotes its i-th coordinate. If X is a set,
Xn denotes the set of n dimensional vector over X. Xa×b denotes the set of a
by b matrices with entries in X. The (i, j)-th entry of a 2 dimensional matrix X
is denoted by X[i, j]. If S is a set, then s
$←− S denotes the operation of sampling
an elements uniformly at random from S. Notation 〈a,b〉 represents standard
scalar product of vector a and b with equal-length.
The security parameter is denoted by λ throughout the paper. We let negl(λ)
denote some unspecified function such that it approaches zero faster than recip-
rocal of every polynomial f(λ), saying that such a function is negligible.
2.2 Hashing
A family of hash functions H = {Hi : {0, 1}n → R} is universal if for all
x1 6= x2 ∈ {0, 1}n, Pr[H(x1) = H(x2) : H $←− H] ≤ 1|R| .
A hash function H = (K,H) is a target collision-resistant (tcr) if for every
polynomial time adversary A, the tcr-advantage
AdvtcrH (A) = Pr[H(k, x1) = H(k, x2) : (x1, st) $←− A; k ← K;x2 $←− A(k, st)]
of A against H is negligible [Boldyreva et al. 2008].
2.3 Randomness extractor
Here we review a few concepts related probability distributions and extracting
uniform bits from weak random sources.
The statistical distance between two probability distributions X and Y over
the same domain D is ∆(X,Y ) = 12Σa∈D |Pr[X = a] − Pr[Y = a]|. The min-
entropy of a random variable X is H∞(X) = − log(maxxPr[X = x]). A distri-
bution X over {0, 1}l is called a (t, l)-source if H∞(X) ≥ t. A distribution X is
ǫ-close to a t-source if there exists a t-source Y such that ∆(X,Y ) ≤ ǫ. Average
min-entropy, which captures the remaining unpredictability of X conditioned on
the value of Y , is H˜∞(X|Y ) = − log(Ey←Y [2−H∞(X|Y=y)]).
Lemma 2.1 (Generalized leftover hash lemma(LHL) [Dodis et al. 2004]).
Let H be a family of universal hash functions with range R. Let X and Y
be random variables such that X ∈ {0, 1}n and H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ log |R| + 2 log( 1ǫ ).
Then for h
$←− H, we have ∆((Y, h, h(X)), (Y, h, U)) ≤ ǫ, where U is the uniform
distribution over the range R.
Lemma 2.2 (Chain Rule [Dodis et al. 2004]). If Y has 2r values and Z is
any random variable, then H˜∞(X|(Y, Z)) ≥ H˜∞(X|Z)− r.
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2.4 Identity-based lossy trapdoor functions
The notion of IB-LTDF, introduced by Bellare et al. [Bellare et al. 2012], is an
extension of LTDF in the identity-based setting. In an identity-based lossy trap-
door functions collection, which mode (injective or lossy) the function operates
depends on the identity. To properly define lossiness in the identity-based setting,
Bellare et al. added an auxiliary input from auxiliary input space AuxSp when
generating the parameters. Depending on the value of this auxiliary input, it can
obtain the injective trapdoor function or lossy function. aux ∈ AuxSp denotes a
particular auxiliary input independent of any identity, which results in an injec-
tive setup. That is, under the injective setup, the evaluation function is injective
for any identity. Aux(·) (called auxiliary input generator in [Bellare et al. 2012])
denotes an algorithm that takes as input an identity from identity space IDSp
and returns an auxiliary input in AuxSp. aux(id) denotes an auxiliary input pro-
duced by an auxiliary input generator Aux(id) taking as input special identity
id, which results in a lossy setup. That is, under the lossy setup, the identity id
lead to lossy evaluation functions, used in the security proof. The requirement
is that it is hard to distinguish lossy identities from injective ones. Next, we
review the notion of identity-based lossy trapdoor functions proposed by Bellare
et al. [Bellare et al. 2012] in the selective-id case.
Definition 1 (IB-LTDF). A collection of identity-based (n, k)-lossy trapdoor
functions with the identity space IDSp, input space InSp, and auxiliary input
space AuxSp is a tuple of (possibly probabilistic) polynomial time algorithms
(Setup, KG, Eval, Inv) with the following specifications:
Setup(1λ, aux). For fixed particular auxiliary input aux ∈ AuxSp, the algorithm
outputs (mpk,msk), where mpk is public parameters and msk is its master
secret key.
KG(mpk,msk, id). Given mpk,msk, identity id ∈ IDSp the probabilistic algo-
rithm outputs a private key skid with respect to the given id.
Eval(mpk, id, x). The deterministic algorithm takes as input mpk, identity id ∈
IDSp, and x ∈ {0, 1}n, outputs a value y.
Inv(mpk, skid, y). The deterministic algorithm takes as input mpk , private key
skid, and a value y, outputs either x ∈ {0, 1}n or ⊥.
We require that the following correctness and lossiness requirements hold:
– Injective correctness and invertibility. For any id ∈ IDSp, the evaluation
algorithm computes a deterministic injective function over the input space
{0, 1}n, which can be inverted using the private key skid corresponding to
the given id. Formally, for aux ∈ AuxSp, (mpk,msk) ← Setup(1λ, aux),
skid ← KG(mpk,msk, id), and x ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr[Inv(mpk, skid,Eval(mpk, id, x)) 6= x] ≤ negl(λ)
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– Lossiness. Sample an identity id
$←− IDSp, for auxiliary input aux(id) ←
Aux(id), (mpk,msk) ← Setup(1λ, aux(id)), the image of the algorithm
Eval(mpk, id, ·) has size at most 2n−k. That is |Eval(mpk, id, ·)| ≤ 2n−k.
– Indistinguishability of lossy identities and injective identities. For the auxil-
iary inputs aux, aux(id) ∈ AuxSp, the first output mpk0 of Setup(1λ, aux)
and the first output mpk1 of Setup(1
λ, aux(id)) are computationally indis-
tinguishable. That is, for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A
AdvINDIB-LTDF,A(λ) =
|Pr[A(mpk0, 1λ)KG(·) = 1]− Pr[A(mpk1, 1λ)KG(·) = 1]|
is negligible, where KG(·) denotes that A can make private key query on
identity id by calling KG algorithm. For d ∈ {0, 1}, A(mpkd, 1λ) is defined
as follows:
(1) The adversary A outputs an identity id∗ as the target identity.
(2) The challenger C samples aux ∈ AuxSp and aux(id∗) ← Aux(id∗),
and computes (mpk0,msk0) ← Setup(1λ, aux), (mpk1,msk1) ← Setup(1λ,
aux(id∗)). The challenger then sends mpkd to A.
(3) The adversary A makes private secret query for identity id with restric-
tion that id 6= id∗. C returns skid to A by calling the algorithm KG.
(4) A outputs a guess d′ ∈ {0, 1}.
2.5 Deterministic identity-based encryption
An deterministic identity-based encryption (DIBE) scheme DEIB is a tuple of
polynomial time algorithm (DIB.Setup, DIB.Der, DIB.Enc, DIB.Dec). The prob-
ability algorithm DIB.Setup takes as input a security parameter 1λ, and outputs
a master key pair (mpk,msk), wherempk is master public key andmsk is master
secret key. The key derivation algorithm DIB.Der takes as input an identity id
and master secret key. It returns the private key skid associated with the identity
id. The deterministic encryption algorithm DIB.Enc takes as input the master
public key mpk, and identity id and a message m. It outputs a ciphertext C. The
decryption algorithm DIB.D takes as input identity id, its associated private key
skid, and a ciphertext C. It returns a message m or the symbol ⊥.
PRIV1-IND-ID-CCA security. An DIBE scheme DEIB is PRIV1 selective-
id secure against chosen-ciphertext attack for (t, n)-source M0 and M1 and all
polynomial time adversary A = (A1,A2), the advantage
AdvPRIV1-IND-ID-CCADEIB,A (λ) =
|Pr[GuessCCADEIB,A(M0) = 1]− Pr[GuessCCADEIB,A(M1) = 1]|
of A against DEIB is negligible. Where GuessCCADEIB,A(Mb) for b ∈ {0, 1} is defined
as follows:
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– The adversary A outputs an identity id∗ as the target identity.
– The challenger runs (mpk,msk)← DIB.Setup(1λ), and sends mpk to A2.
– A2 is allowed to make a number of private key queries and decryption queries
for identity id:
Private key query. The adversary A2 asks for the private key correspond-
ing to any identity id as long as id 6= id∗. The challenger correctly generates
private key skid for id and returns to A2.
Decryption query.A2 issues decryption queries C for identity id. The chal-
lenger responds with DIB.Dec(C, id, skid) using private key skid correctly
generated for id.
– The challenger samplesm from distributionMb ((M0,M1, state)
$←− A1(1λ)),
and computes C∗ = DIB.Enc(mpk, id∗,m), and then sends C∗ to A2.
– A2 outputs its guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
3 Identity-based ABO-TDF and its construction
In this section, we first introduce the notion of identity-based ABO-TDF. Then
based on the basic IBE scheme of Bellare et al. [Bellare et al. 2012], we propose a
concrete construction of IB-ABO-TDF under decisional linear (DLIN) assump-
tion. Let G be a finite cyclic group of prime order p specified by a randomly
chosen generator g. The DLIN assumption says that gr1+···+rdd+1 is pseudorandom
given g1, . . . , gd+1, g
r1
1 , . . . , g
rd
d where g1, . . . , gd+1
$←− G; r1, . . . , rd $←− Zp.
3.1 Identity-based ABO-TDF
Identity-based ABO-TDF can be viewed as a specific kind of ABO-TDF with
two variable (id, tag) as a branch. The first component id of branch (id, tag) is
user’s identity, and the second component tag is the label. If and only if id is
lossy identity and tag is lossy label, the branch (id, tag) is lossy branch. In our
construction, similarly, we follow the method of Bellare et al. [Bellare et al. 2012]
for constructing IB-LTDF. In setup phrase, algorithm takes an additional auxil-
iary input from an auxiliary input space AuxSp. Lossy identities are determined
by an auxiliary input which is hidden in the master public key. The definition
of identity-based all-but-one trapdoor functions is described as follows.
Definition 2 (IB-ABO-TDF). A collection of (n, k)-identity-based all-but-
one trapdoor functions with the identity space IDSp, auxiliary input space
AuxSp and label space TagSp, is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms (Setupabo,
KGabo, Evalabo, Invabo) with the following specifications:
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Setupabo(1
λ, aux, tag∗). For aux
$←− AuxSp, tag∗ $←− TagSp, the algorithm out-
puts (mpk,msk, B˜), where mpk is master public key and msk is master
secret key, and B˜ ⊂ IDSp× TagSp is a set of lossy branches.
KGabo(mpk,msk, id). Given mpk,msk, identity id ∈ IDSp, the probabilistic
algorithm outputs a private key skid with respect to the identity id.
Evalabo(mpk, id, tag, x). For any tag ∈ TagSp, id ∈ IDSp, the algorithm takes
as input mpk, id, tag, and x ∈ {0, 1}n, outputs a value C.
Invabo(mpk, skid, C). The deterministic algorithm takes as input mpk, private
key skid, and a value C, outputs either x ∈ {0, 1}n or ⊥.
We require that the following properties hold:
– Injective correctness and invertibility. For any (id, tag) ∈ IDSp × TagSp, if
(id, tag) 6∈ B˜, where (mpk,msk, B˜)← Setupabo(1λ, aux, tag∗), the algorithm
Evalabo(mpk, id, tag, ·) computes a deterministic injective function over the
domain {0, 1}n, which can be inverted using the private key skid correspond-
ing to the given id. Formally, (mpk,msk, B˜) ← Setupabo(1λ, aux, tag∗),
skid ← KGabo(mpk,msk, id), (id, tag) 6∈ B˜, and x ∈ {0, 1}n
Pr[Invabo(mpk, skid,Evalabo(mpk, id, tag, x)) 6= x] ≤ negl(λ)
– Lossiness. For any (id, tag) ∈ IDSp× TagSp, if (id, tag) ∈ B˜, the algorithm
Evalabo(mpk, id, tag, ·) computes a deterministic function over the domain
{0, 1}n whose image has size at most 2n−k.
– Indistinguishability of lossy branch. For every probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm A, the first output mpk1 of Setupabo(1λ, aux1, tag1) and the first
output mpk2 of Setupabo(1
λ, aux2, tag2) are computationally indistinguish-
able. Formally, the advantage
AdvINDIB-ABO-TDF,A(λ) =
|Pr[A(mpk1, 1λ)KGabo(·) = 1]− Pr[A(mpk2, 1λ)KGabo(·) = 1]|
of A is negligible, where (mpkd,msk, B˜)← Setupabo(1λ, auxd, tagd) for d ∈
{1, 2}. KGabo(·) denotes that A can make private key query on identity id
by calling KGabo algorithm.
– Hard to find one-more lossy branch. Any probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithm A that receives (mpk, id, tag) as input, where (id, tag) ∈ B˜, has only
a negligible probability of outputing a pair (id′, tag′) ∈ B˜\{id, tag}.
3.2 The construction of identity-based ABO-TDF
Fix a bilinear map e : G × G → GT , where G,GT are groups of prime order
p. By 1,1T we denote the identity elements of G,GT , respectively. By G
∗ =
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G − {1} we denote the set of generators of G. For vectors y = (y0, y1) ∈ Z2p,
tag = (tag0, tag1) and id ∈ Zp. We let fid(y) = (y0+y1id)modp. For any integer
n and any identity space IDSp ⊆ Zp, message space {0, 1}n and auxiliary input
space AuxSp ⊆ Z2p, the algorithms of IB-ABO-TDF are as follows.
Setupabo(1
λ,y, tag∗). Given auxiliary input y = (1, 0) ∈ Z2p, tag∗ = (tag∗0 ,
tag∗1) ∈ Z2p, let g $←− G∗, t $←− Z∗p, gˆ = gt. Then let U $←− G, s $←− (Z∗p)n, sˆ $←− Znp ,
H, Hˆ,V0,V1, Vˆ0, Vˆ1
$←− Gn. It returns master public key mpk = (g, gˆ,G, Gˆ,
J,W0,W1,H, Hˆ, V0,V1, Vˆ0, Vˆ1, U), where for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
G[i] = gs[i], Gˆ[i] = gˆsˆ[i], J[i, j] = H[j]s[i]Hˆ[j]sˆ[i],
W0[i, j] = V0[j]
s[i]Vˆ0[j]
sˆ[i](Uy0gtag
∗
0 )s[i]∆(i,j)
W1[i, j] = V1[j]
s[i]Vˆ1[j]
sˆ[i](Uy1gtag
∗
1 )s[i]∆(i,j)
Where ∆(i, j) = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. The master secret key msk = t and
the set of lossy branches B˜ = {(id, tag)|fid(y) = 0modp ∧ tag = tag∗}.
KGabo(mpk,msk, id). Given mpk,msk, identity id ∈ Zp, the algorithm com-
putes decryption key skid = (D1,D2,D3,D4), where r
$←− (Z∗p)n, rˆ $←− Znp , and
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
D1[i] = (V0[i] ·V1[i]id)tr[i] ·H[i]trˆ[i], D2[i] = (Vˆ0[i] · Vˆ1[i]id)r[i] · Hˆ[i]rˆ[i]
D3[i] = g
−tr[i], D4[i] = g
−trˆ[i]
Evalabo(mpk, id, tag, x). Given mpk, identity id ∈ Zp, tag = (tag0, tag1) ∈
Z
2
p, input x ∈ {0, 1}n, the algorithm computes the value C = (C1, C2,C3,C4)
where for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let S[j] = G[j]−x[j]fid(tag)
C1 =
n∏
i=1
G[i]x[i], C2 =
n∏
i=1
Gˆ[i]x[i]
C3[j] = S[j]
n∏
i=1
(W0[i, j]W1[i, j]
id)x[i], C4[j] =
n∏
i=1
J[i, j]x[i]
Invabo(mpk, skid,C). Given mpk, ciphertext C = (C1, C2,C3,C4) for iden-
tity id, the algorithm returns x ∈ {0, 1}n where for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, it sets x[j] = 0
if
e(C1,D1[j])e(C2,D2[j])e(C3[j],D3[j])e(C4[j],D4[j]) = 1T
and 1 otherwise.
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Correctness and invertibility. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let I = (Ufid(y)gfid(tag∗))
C1 =
n∏
i=1
G[i]x[i] = g〈s,x〉 C2 =
n∏
i=1
Gˆ[i]x[i] = gˆ〈sˆ,x〉
C3[j] = S[j]
n∏
i=1
(W0[i, j]W1[i, j]
id)x[i]
= S[j]
n∏
i=1
(V0[j]V1[j]
id)s[i]x[i](Vˆ0[j]Vˆ1[j]
id)sˆ[i]x[i]Is[i]x[i]∆(i,j)
= (V0[j] ·V1[j]id)〈s,x〉(Vˆ0[j] · Vˆ1[j]id)〈sˆ,x〉(Ufid(y)gfid(tag
∗−tag))s[j]x[j]
C4[j] =
n∏
i=1
J[i, j]x[i] =
n∏
i=1
H[j]s[i]x[i]Hˆ[j]sˆ[i]x[i] = H[j]〈s,x〉Hˆ[j]〈sˆ,x〉
Thus
e(C1,D1[j])e(C2,D2[j])e(C3[j],D3[j])e(C4[j],D4[j])
= e((Ufid(y)gfid(tag
∗−tag))s[j]x[j],D3[j])
Because we chose s[i] to be non-zero modulo p, fid(y) = 1modp 6= 0, therefore,
(id, tag) 6∈ B˜, if
e(C1,D1[j])e(C2,D2[j])e(C3[j],D3[j])e(C4[j],D4[j]) = 1T ,
then x[j] = 0, if the result of the pairing is never 1T , then the inversion algorithm
will correctly recover x[j] = 1.
Lossiness. On input a selective identity id∗ ∈ IDSp, the algorithm Aux(id∗)
returns y = (−id∗, 1). Obviously, fid∗(y) = 0modp, when tag = tag∗, we have
(id∗, tag) ∈ B˜. We show that if (id, tag) ∈ B˜, then algorithm Evalabo(mpk, id,
tag, ·) evaluates a lossy function. Due to fid(y) = 0modp and tag = tag∗,
then the dependency of C3[j] on x[j] vanishes. Examing (C1, C2,C3,C4), we see
that with mpk fixed, the values 〈s, x〉, 〈sˆ, x〉 determine the ciphertext C. Thus
there are at most p2 possible ciphertexts when (id, tag) ∈ B˜. This means that
R = |Evalabo(mpk, id, tag, ·)| ≤ p2. Moreover, the lossy branch of IB-ABO-TDF
is universal. That is, if x1 6= x2, for s, sˆ $←− Znp , Pr[Evalabo(mpk, id, tag, x1) =
Evalabo(mpk, id, tag, x2)] = Pr[(〈s, x1〉, 〈sˆ, x1〉) = (〈s, x2〉, 〈sˆ, x2〉)] = 1p2 ≤ 1|R| .
Indistinguishability of lossy branches. From Theorem 1, we can see that,
under the decision linear (DLIN) assumption, it is hard to distinguish the mas-
ter public key and random group elements. Therefore, the first output mpk1 of
Setup(1λ,y1, tag1) and the first output mpk2 of Setup(1
λ,y2, tag2) are com-
putationally indistinguishable.
Hard to find one-more lossy branch. We show that any probabilistic polyno-
mial time adversary A that receives (mpk, id, tag) as input, where (id, tag) ∈ B˜,
outputs a pair (id′, tag′) satisfying (id′, tag′) 6= (id, tag) and (id′, tag′) ∈ B˜
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with negligible probability. To see this, observe that the value y and tag∗ are
initially hidden by the public parameter W0[i, j],W1[i, j], from Theorem 1, we
know that W0[i, j],W1[i, j] are indistinguishable from a random element in the
group G to any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A. However, A could
obtain the information that ufid(y)+fid(tag
∗−tag) = 0 (let U = gu). There are
exactly p2 pairs which satisfy this equation and each of them are equally likely.
Therefore, we can conclude that the adversary has only negligible probability of
outputing a pair (id′, tag′) ∈ B˜\{id, tag} without master secret key.
In order to prove the indistinguishability of lossy branches (i.e Theorem 1),
we first prove the following lemma. That is, the basic ciphertext which contain
certain ‘atoms” from which, given an identity, one can reconstruct ciphertext of
the resemble Bellar et al.’s basic IBE scheme, is indistinguishable from random
group elements. The concrete games are described in table 2.
Lemma 3.1. Game Greal and game Grandom are computationally indistin-
guishable under DLIN assumption.
Proof. This proof via a series of games G0, G1, G2, G3, where game G0 is
the game Greal and game G3 is the game Grandom. Game G1 is the same as
game G0 except S
$←− G in challenge phase, Game G2 is the same as game G1
except W0
$←− G in challenge phase. Game G3 is the same as game G2 except
W1
$←− G in challenge phase. We then show that for i = 0, 1, 2, Gi and Gi+1 are
computationally indistinguishable under DLIN assumption. It follows that the
Lemma holds. The advantage of a distinguisher B attacking DLIN assumption
is denoted by AdvDLINB (λ).
Claim 1. Pr[G0 ⇒ 1]− Pr[G1 ⇒ 1] ≤ AdvDLINB1 (λ).
Proof.We prove this claim by describing a distinguisher B1 is given (g, gˆ, gs, gˆsˆ,
H,T ) where T is either Hs+sˆ or random. B1 runs adversary A responding to
its queries as follows. When A makes query to Initialize(iλ,y, tag), B1 chooses
y ∈ Z2p, tag ∈ Z2p, u, v $←− Zp, v = (v0, v1), vˆ = (vˆ0, vˆ1) $←− Z2p and computes
Hˆ = Hgˆv, U = gˆu, for k = 0, 1, Vk = U
−ykgtagkgvk , Vˆk = gˆ
vˆk . B1 returns
(g, gˆ,H, Hˆ, V0, V1, Vˆ0, Vˆ1, U) to A.
When A makes private-key query to Getsk(id), B1 does the following: If
fid(y) = 0 then return ⊥. Else B1 chooses r′, rˆ′ $←− Zp, and computes
D1 = U
−fid(y)r
′
g(fid(tag)+fid(v))r
′
H
rˆ′(fid(v)+fid(tag))
fid(y)
D2 = g
r′fid(vˆ)H
−
rˆ′fid(vˆ)
fid(y) Hurˆ
′
, D3 = g
−r′H
rˆ′
fid(y) , D4 = gˆ
−urˆ′
Then B1 returns skid = (D1, D2, D3, D4) to A.
We claim that skid is a correctly distributed and valid random private key
for the identity id. To see this, let h be such that H = gh and let r = r
′
t
− hrˆ′
tfid(y)
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Greal: Grandom:
Initialize(1λ,y, tag) Initialize(1λ,y, tag)
g
$←− G∗; t $←− Z∗p; H, Hˆ $←− G g $←− G∗; t $←− Z∗p; H, Hˆ $←− G
U
$←− G∗; V = (V0, V1) $←− G2 U $←− G∗ V = (V0, V1) $←− G2
Vˆ = (Vˆ0, Vˆ1)
$←− G2; msk ← t Vˆ = (Vˆ0, Vˆ1) $←− G2; msk ← t
mpk ← (g, gˆ,H, Hˆ,V, Vˆ, U) mpk ← (g, gˆ,H, Hˆ,V, Vˆ, U)
Return mpk Return mpk
Getsk(id) Getsk(id)
If fid(y) = 0 then skid ← ⊥ If fid(y) = 0 then skid ← ⊥
Else skid ← (D1, D2, D3, D4) Else skid ← (D1, D2, D3, D4)
r, rˆ
$←− Z∗p; D1 ← (V0V id1 )trHtrˆ r, rˆ $←− Z∗p; D1 ← (V0V id1 )trHtrˆ
D2 ← (Vˆ0Vˆ id1 )rHˆ rˆ D2 ← (Vˆ0Vˆ id1 )rHˆ rˆ
D3 ← g−tr, D4 ← g−trˆ D3 ← g−tr, D4 ← g−trˆ
Challenge (it has no identity input) Challenge (it has no identity input)
s
$←− Z∗p; sˆ $←− Zp; G← gs; Gˆ← gˆsˆ G $←− G; Gˆ $←− G
S ← HsHˆ sˆ S $←− G
W0 ← (Uy0gtag0V0)sVˆ sˆ0 W0 $←− G
W1 ← (Uy1gtag1V1)sVˆ sˆ1 W1 $←− G
Return (G, Gˆ, S,W0,W1) Return (G, Gˆ, S,W0,W1)
Finalize((d′)) Finalize((d′))
Return d′ = 1 Return d′ = 1
Table 2: Games for the proof of Lemma 3.1. Border areas indicate the difference
between the games
and rˆ = urˆ′. Then we have
D1 = (V0V
id
1 )
trHtrˆ = (U−y0gtag0gv0(U−y1gtag1gv1)id)trHtrˆ
= (U−fid(y)gfid(tag)gfid(v))
t( r
′
t
− hrˆ
′
tfid(y)
)
Hturˆ
′
= U−fid(y)r
′
Uhrˆ
′
g(fid(tag)+fid(v))r
′
g
−(fid(tag)+fid(v))hrˆ
′
fid(y) ghturˆ
′
= U−fid(y)r
′
gˆuhrˆ
′
g(fid(tag)+fid(v))r
′
H
−(fid(tag)+fid(v))rˆ
′
fid(y) gˆhurˆ
′
= U−fid(y)r
′
g(fid(tag)+fid(v))r
′
H
rˆ′(fid(v)+fid(tag))
fid(y)
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D2 = (Vˆ0Vˆ
id
1 )
rHˆ rˆ = (gˆv0 gˆv1id)rHˆ rˆ = g
tfid(vˆ)(
r′
t
− hrˆ
′
tfid(y)
)
Hˆurˆ
′
= gfid(vˆ)r
′
g
−
hrˆ′fid(vˆ)
fid(y) Hˆurˆ
′
= gfid(vˆ)r
′
H
−
rˆ′fid(vˆ)
fid(y) Hˆurˆ
′
D3 = g
−tr = g
−t( r
′
t
− hrˆ
′
tfid(y)
)
= g−r
′
H
rˆ′
fid(y)
D4 = g
−trˆ = g−turˆ
′
= gˆ−urˆ
′
Since t, fid(y) are non-zero module p and r
′, rˆ′ are uniform and independent
in Zp, r, rˆ are uniform as well. This matches the distribution of private key of
identity id generated by Getsk. Thus, skid is a valid private key of the identity
id.
When A makes its Challenge query, B1 computes S = T gˆvsˆ, for k = 0, 1, do
Wk = g
svk gˆsˆvˆk and returns (g, gˆsˆ, S,W0,W1) to A. We can see that for k = 0, 1,
Wk = g
svk gˆsˆvˆk = (UykgtagkU−ykg−tagkgvk)s(gˆvˆk)sˆ = (UykgtagkVk)
sVˆ sˆk
If B1 was given a DLIN instance, that is T = Hs+sˆ, then we have
S = T gˆvsˆ = Hs+sˆgˆvsˆ = Hs(Hgˆv)sˆ = HsHˆ sˆ
We see that B1 simulates game G0. Otherwise, B1 was given a non-DLIN in-
stance, i.e T
$←− G, then S $←− G, B1 simulates game G1. Finally, A outputs d′,
B1 also outputs d′. So this completes the claim.
Claim 2. Pr[G1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[G2 ⇒ 1] ≤ AdvDLINB2 (λ).
Proof. Similar to claim 1, we design a simulator B2 such that it is given
(g, gˆ, gs, gˆsˆ, Uˆ , T ) where T is either Uˆs+sˆ or random. B2 runs adversary A re-
sponding to its queries as follows. When A makes query Initialize(iλ,y, tag), B2
chooses y ∈ AuxSp, tag ∈ TagSp, u, h, hˆ $←− Zp, v = (v0, v1), vˆ = (vˆ0, vˆ1) $←− Z2p,
and computes H ← gˆh, Hˆ = gˆhˆ, U = gu, V0 = Uˆgv0 , V1 = gv1 , Vˆ0 = Uˆ gˆvˆ0 ,
Vˆ1 = gˆ
vˆ1 . B2 returns (g, gˆ,H, Hˆ, V0, V1, Vˆ0, Vˆ1, U) to adversary A.
WhenAmakes query private-key Getsk(id), B2 does the following: If fid(y) =
0 then return ⊥. Else B2 chooses r, rˆ′ $←− Zp, and computes
D1 = gˆ
fid(v)rH rˆ
′
, D2 = Uˆ
r gˆrfid(vˆ)H rˆ
′
Uˆ
−hˆr
h
D3 = gˆ
−r, D4 = g
−rˆ′Uˆ
r
h
Then B2 returns skid = (D1, D2, D3, D4) to A.
We claim that skid is a correctly distributed and valid random private key
for the identity id. To see this, let uˆ be such that Uˆ = guˆ and let rˆ = rˆ
′
t
− uˆr
ht
.
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Then we have
D1 = (V0V
id
1 )
trHtrˆ = (Uˆgv0gv1)trHtrˆ
= (Uˆ trgfid(v))tr gˆhtrˆ
= (Uˆ trgfid(v))tr gˆht(
rˆ′
t
− uˆr
ht
)
= (guˆtrgfid(v))tr gˆhrˆ
′
gˆ−uˆr
= (gfid(v))trH rˆ
′
D2 = (Vˆ0Vˆ
id
1 )
rHˆ rˆ = (Uˆ gˆvˆ0 gˆvˆ1id)rHˆ rˆ
= Uˆr gˆrfid(vˆ)Hˆ(
rˆ′
t
− uˆr
ht
)
= Uˆr gˆrfid(vˆ)gˆhˆ(
rˆ′
t
− uˆr
ht
)
= Uˆr gˆrfid(vˆ)ghˆrˆ
′
g
−hˆuˆr
h
= Uˆr gˆrfid(vˆ)H rˆ
′
Uˆ
−hˆr
h
D3 = g
−tr = gˆ−r
D4 = g
−trˆ = g−t(
rˆ′
t
− uˆr
ht
) = g−rˆ
′
g
uˆr
h = g−rˆ
′
Uˆ
r
h
Since t, fid(y) are non-zero module p and rˆ
′ are uniform and independent in Zp,
rˆ are uniform as well. This matches the distribution of private key of identity id
generated by Getsk. Thus, skid is a valid private key of the identity id.
When A makes its Challenge query, B2 computesW0 = (gs)uy0+tag0+v0(gˆsˆ)vˆ0
·T , W1 = (gs)uy1+tag1+v1(gˆsˆ)vˆ1 and returns (g, gˆsˆ, S,W0,W1) to A. We can see
that
W1 = (g
s)uy1+tag1+v1(gˆsˆ)vˆ1 = (Uy1gtag1V1)
sVˆ sˆ1
If B2 was given a DLIN instance, that is T = Uˆs+sˆ, then we have
W0 = (g
s)uy0+tag0+v0(gˆsˆ)vˆ0 · T
= (Uy0gtag0Uˆ−1V0)
s(Uˆ−1Vˆ0)
sˆUˆs+sˆ
= (Uy0gtag0V0)
sUˆ−sUˆ−sˆVˆ sˆ0 Uˆ
s+sˆ
= (Uy0gtag0V0)
sVˆ sˆ0
We see that B2 simulates game G1 in this case. Otherwise, B2 was given a non-
DLIN instance, i.e T
$←− G, then W0 $←− G, B2 simulates game G2. Finally, A
outputs d′, B2 also outputs d′. So this completes the claim.
Claim 3. Pr[G2 ⇒ 1]− Pr[G3 ⇒ 1] ≤ AdvDLINB2 (λ).
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Claim 2. The only differences are, in
the Initialize(iλ,y, tag) query phase, the simulator B2 lets V0 = gv0 , V1 = Uˆgv1 ,
Vˆ0 = gˆ
vˆ0 , Vˆ1 = Uˆ gˆ
vˆ1 , in the private key query phase, lets rˆ = rˆ
′
t
− iduˆr
ht
, and
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in the challenge phrase, the simulator B2 computes W0 = (gs)uy0+tag0+v0(gˆsˆ)vˆ0
and W1 = (g
s)uy1+tag1+v1(gˆsˆ)vˆ1 · T .
Theorem 1. The first output mpk1 of Setupabo(1
λ,y1, tag1) and the first
output mpk2 of Setupabo(1
λ,y2, tag2) are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. We first prove that mpkb for b ∈ {0, 1} and random group elemen-
t matrices are computationally indistinguishable. It is obvious that the the-
orem follows. To prove mpkb generated by Setupabo(1
λ,yb, tagb) is indistin-
guishable from random group element matrices, we define a set of hybrid games
R1, · · · , Rn. In Rl (1 ≤ l ≤ n), where game R1 produces a real public parameter
matrices and Rn produces a random public parameter matrices. Below we argue
that for every l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, any distinguisher A of the two games Rl−1 and Rl
can be used to distinguish Greal from Grandom. From Lemma 3.1, Rl−1 and Rl
are indistinguishable, therefore, this theorem holds.
Let adversary A be a distinguisher of Rl−1 and Rl, the simulator B is an
adversary distinguishing Greal from Grandom.
Simulating public parameter. The simulator B is given (g, gˆ,H, Hˆ, V0, V1,
Vˆ0, Vˆ1, U) ← Inaitialize(1λ,y, tag) and (G, Gˆ, S,W0,W1) ← Challenge where
(G, Gˆ, S,W0,W1) is either real or random. B chooses h, hˆ $←− (Z∗p)n, v0, v1, vˆ0,
vˆ1
$←− Znp , s $←− (Z∗p)n, sˆ $←− Znp . For i = 1, . . . , n
– If i 6= l then H[i] ← gh[i], Hˆ[i] ← ghˆ[i], Vk[i] ← gvk[i], Vˆk[i] ← gvˆk[i] (k =
0, 1), G[i]← gs[i], Gˆ[i]← gsˆ[i]. For j = 1, . . . , n, J[i, j]← H[j]s[i]Hˆ[j]sˆ[i].
– If i = l then H[i] ← H, Hˆ[i] ← Hˆ, Vk[i] ← Vk, Vˆk[i] ← Vˆk (k = 0, 1),
G[i] ← G, Gˆ[i] ← Gˆ. For j = 1, . . . , n, if j 6= i then J[i, j] ← Gh[j]Gˆhˆ[j], if
j = i then J[i, j]← S.
– For j = 1, . . . , n, k = 0, 1, if i = j and i ≤ l − 1 then Wk[i, j] $←− G; if i = j
and i = l then Wk[i, j]←Wk; otherwise
Wk[i, j]← Vk[j]s[i]Vˆk[j]sˆ[i](Uykgtagk)s[i]∆(i,j)
B then sends paras = (g, gˆ,H, Hˆ,V0,V1, Vˆ0, Vˆ1, G, Gˆ,J,W0,W1, U) to A.
Simulating private key. When the simulator B simulates the private key skid
for identity id which is chosen by the adversary A, B first queries its own Getsk
oracle and is given (D1, D2, D3, D4) ← Getsk(id). If fid(y) = 0 then B returns
⊥. Otherwise, B chooses r′ $←− (Z∗p)n, rˆ′ $←− (Zp)n. For i = 1, . . . , n
– If i 6= l then D1[i] ← (V0[i]V1[i]id)r′[i]H[i]rˆ′[i], D2[i] ← gfid(vˆ)r′[i]ghˆ[i]rˆ′[i],
D3[i]← g−r′[i], D4[i]← g−rˆ′[i].
– If i = l then (D1[i],D2[i],D3[i],D4[i])← (D1, D2, D3, D4).
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Where r[i] = r
′[i]
t
, rˆ[i] = rˆ
′[i]
t
for i 6= l. Here t is the master secret key, so
that gˆ = gt. Because r′[i], rˆ′[i] are random, so the above simulation matches the
distribution of the private key.
Note that if (G, Gˆ, S,W0,W1) is real, B perfectly simulates the game Rl−1,
but if (G, Gˆ, S,W0,W1) is random, B perfectly simulates the game Rl. Finally,
B outputs what A outputs. Since B perfectly simulates game Rl−1 or game Rl
depending on the (G, Gˆ, S,W0,W1). This completes the proof of the theorem.
4 CCA-secure DIBE scheme
Given the identity space IDSp and auxiliary input space AuxSp, let ΠLF =
(LF.Setup, LF.KG, LF.Eval, LF.Inv) be an identity-based lossy trapdoor func-
tion with 2rLF -bounded lossy function range RLF (i.e., in the lossy mode, the
image ofΠLF has size at most 2
rLF), letΠabo = (Setupabo,KGabo,Evalabo, Invabo)
be an identity-based all-but-one trapdoor function with branches set B = IDSp×
TagSp (TagSp is tag space) and with 2rabo -bounded lossy function range Rabo,
and let Htcr = (Ktcr, Htcr) be a target collision-resistant hash function with
2rtcr -bounded hash range Rtcr ⊆ TagSp\{tag∗}. We assume that the DIBE
scheme has message space {0, 1}l. Our deterministic identity-based encryption
scheme DEIB = (DIB.Setup,DIB.Der,DIB.Enc,DIB.Dec) is defined as follows.
DIB.Setup(1λ). aux0, aux1
$←− AuxSp, (mpkLF,mskLF)← LF.Setup(1λ, aux0),
(mpkabo,mskabo) ← Setupabo(1λ, aux1, tag∗), ktcr $←− Ktcr. Return mpk =
(mpkLF,mpkabo, ktcr), msk = mskLF.
DIB.Der(mpk,msk, id). skid ← LF.KG(mpkLF,mskLF, id). Return skid.
DIB.Enc(mpk, id,m). h← Htcr(m), c1 ← LF.Eval(mpkLF, id,m), c2 ← Evalabo
(mpkabo, id, h,m). Return C = h‖c1‖c2.
DIB.Dec(mpk, id, skid, C). Parse C as C = h‖c1‖c2, compute m′ ← LF.Inv
(mpkLF, skid, c1), C
′ ← DIB.Enc(mpk, id,m′). If C ′ = C then return m′,
otherwise return ⊥.
Note that consistency of the above scheme follows from the fact that the
particular auxiliary input aux0 is a constant and independent to the identity,
and the range of the tcr hash function does not include the lossy branch of the
identity-based ABO-TDF. So both LF.Eval(mpkLF, id, ·) and Evalabo(mpkabo,
id, h, ·) are injective trapdoor functions. For all output (mpk,msk) by DIB.Setup
and all m ∈ {0, 1}l, there is exactly one string C such that DIB.Dec outputs m.
We now turn to security.
Theorem 2. If ΠLF is a selective-id secure identity-based lossy trapdoor
functions with universal lossy mode, Πabo is a universal identity-based all-but-
one trapdoor functions, and Htcr is universal TCR hash function, if for (t, l)-
sources M0,M1, and any ǫ > 0 such that t ≥ rLF + rabo + rtcr + 2 log( 1ǫ ),
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then the deterministic identity-based encryption scheme DIBE described above
is selective-id PRIV1-secure against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Proof. The proof proceeds via a sequence of games G0, G1, . . . , G6, where
game G0 is the original PRIV1-IND-ID-CCA game, G6 will be independent
of the any underly distribution imposed by the adversary. Then we show that
for all i = 0, . . . , 5, game Gi and Gi+1 are (computationally or statistically)
indistinguishable. It follows that the deterministic IBE scheme is PRIV1-IND-
ID-CCA secure.
G1: This game is the same as the game G0 except that the auxiliary input
and label (aux1, tag
∗) of IB-ABO-TDF is replaced by (aux1(id
∗), h∗), where
h∗ = Htcr(m
∗), id∗ is the target identity chosen in advance by the adversary,
m∗ is chosen from (t, l)-source Mb (b ∈ {0, 1}) by the simulator, and aux1(id∗)
is generated by an auxiliary input generator Aux1(id
∗) which takes input an
identity in IDSp and returns an auxiliary input associated with the identity.
G2: This game is identical to game G1 except that the decryption oracle
rejects all the ciphertext C = h‖c1‖c2 such that h = h∗.
G3: This game is the same as the game G2, the only change is to decryption
oracle, in which if the adversary submits a ciphertext C = h‖c1‖c2 for decryp-
tion, such that (id, h) is a lossy branch, then the decryption oracle immediately
outputs reject and halts.
G4: This game is the same as game G3 except that the decryption ora-
cle decrypted using the master secret key mskabo of IB-ABO-TDF. That is to
say, when the adversary submits a ciphertext C = h‖c1‖c2 for decryption, the
challenger computes m′ ← Invabo(mpkabo, skid, c2) (Note that the challenger op-
erates the algorithm KGabo(mskabo, id) and generates skid for identity id.), and
C ′ ← DIB.Enc(mpk, id,m′). Then it checks whether C ′ = C. If not, it outputs
⊥, otherwise outputs m′.
G5: This game is the same as the game G4, the only change is to the algorithm
DIB.Setup, in which we replace the injective function with a lossy one. Formally,
in the algorithm DIB.Setup, we replace (mpkLF,mskLF)← LF.Setup(1λ, aux0)
with (mpkLF,mskLF)← LF.Setup(1λ, aux0(id∗)), where aux0(id∗) is generated
by an auxiliary input generator Aux0(id
∗) and id∗ is the target identity chosen
in advance by the adversary.
G6: This game is the same as the game G5 except that the challenge cipher-
text is sampled uniformly from the ciphertext space instead of encrypting the
message m sampled from the (t, l)-source Mb. Formally, in the challenge phase,
the challenger chooses randomly h∗
$←− Rtcr, c∗1 $←− RLF, c∗2 $←− Rabo,h∗ as the
challenge ciphertext C∗ = h∗‖c∗1‖c∗2.
Claim 4. Game G0 and game G1 are computationally indistinguishable,
given the indistinguishability of the lossy branch of IB-ABO-TDF.
Proof. We prove this claim by describing an IB-ABO-TDF distinguisher
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algorithm B that receives mpkabo as input where mpkabo is either (mpkabo,
mskabo) ← Setupabo (1λ, aux1, tag∗) or (mpkabo, mskabo) ← Setupabo(1λ,
aux1(id
∗), h∗), where h∗ = Htcr(m
∗), id∗ is the target identity chosen in ad-
vance by the adversary and m∗ is chosen from (t, l)-source Mb (b ∈ {0, 1}) by B.
The distinguisher B operates by implementing DIB.Setup, DIB.Der, DIB.Dec
and challenge. In the DIB.Setup phase, B runs (mpkLF,mskLF) ← LF.Setup
(1λ, aux0) and chooses ktcr
$←− Ktcr. The public key is output as mpk = (mpkLF,
mpkabo, ktcr). We point out that B knows the injective trapdoormskLF, but does
not know the trapdoor mskabo. DIB.Der, DIB.Dec are implemented just as game
G0 and game G1. Note that the only secret information DIB.Der and DIB.Dec
need to operate is mskLF, which the distinguisher knows. Likewise, Challenge
is implemented just as in all the games. Therefore, any difference in behavior
between game G0 and game G1 immediately breaks the hardness of distinguish-
ing a lossy branch from an injective branch of the identity-based ABO trapdoor
functions collection.
Claim 5. Game G1 and game G2 are computationally indistinguishable,
given the target collision-resistant property of the hash function Htcr.
Proof. We begin by observing that game G1 or game G2 behave equivalently
unless an event E happens, which is that the adversary makes a query C =
h‖c1‖c2 to its decryption oracle, where h = h∗. We then show that event E
happens with negligible probability. There are two possibilities to consider for
its decryption. The first is that C is the ciphertext corresponding to m∗. But
by the unique encryption property of deterministic encryption that m∗ has only
one valid ciphertext, namely C∗, which the adversary is not allowed to query
to its decryption oracle. So in fact this possibility cannot occur. The second
possibility is that C decrypts to some m 6= m∗. In this case, we can find a valid
target-collision (m,m∗) of hash function Htcr. By the collision-resistant property
of Htcr, we conclude that event E happens with negligible probability.
Claim 6. Game G2 and game G3 are computationally indistinguishable,
given the hardness of finding one-more lossy branch of IB-ABO-TDF.
Proof. Let F be the event that the adversary makes a legal decryption query
of the form C = h‖c1‖c2, such that (id, h) is lossy branch. It is clear that game
G2 and game G3 proceed identically until the event F happens. We then show
that the event F happens with negligible probability.
Note that, if h = h∗, the decryption oracle rejects the ciphertext in both
games. Therefore, the (id, h) is a new lossy branch of IB-ABO-TDF. By the
hardness of finding one-more lossy branch property of IB-ABO-TDF, the event
F happens with negligible probability, and hence the claim follows.
Claim 7. Game G3 and game G4 are equivalent.
Proof. The only difference between game G3 and game G4 is in the im-
plementation of decryption oracle. We show that decryption oracle is equiv-
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alent in the two games. In both games, when the challenger receives a legal
decryption query of the form C = h‖c1‖c2 from the adversary. It checks that
c1 ← LF.Eval(mpkLF, id, x), c2 ← Evalabo(mpkabo, id, h, x) for some x that they
compute (in different ways), and outputs ⊥ if not. It suffices to show that such
x is unique. Note that, if h = h∗ or (id, h) is lossy branch, the decryption or-
acle outputs reject. Therefore, ΠLF and Πabo are both injective, and there is a
unique x such that (c1, c2) = (LF.Eval(mpkLF, id, x),Evalabo(mpkabo, id, h, x)).
The both implementations of decryption oracle find the x.
Claim 8. Game G4 and game G5 are computationally indistinguishable,
given the indistinguishability of the injective and lossy functions of IB-LTDF.
Proof.We prove this claim by describing an IB-LTDF distinguisher B that re-
ceives mpkLF as input where mpkLF was either generated by LF.Setup(1
λ, aux0)
or generated by LF.Setup(1λ, aux0(id
∗)). Note that the distinguisher B knows
the trapdoor mskabo of IB-ABO-TDF, but does not know the trapdoor mskLF
corresponding to mpkLF. B interacts with the adversary as follows.
In the setup phase, B runs (mpkabo,mskabo)← Setupabo(1λ, aux1(id∗), h∗ =
Htcr(m
∗)), ktcr
$←− Ktcr and outputs public key mpk = (mpkLF,mpkabo, ktcr).
When the adversary makes a legal private key query for identity id (i.e., id 6=
id∗), B obtains skid by querying its own private key extracting oracle on the
identity id, then forwards to the adversary. When the adversary makes a legal
decryption query C = h‖c1‖c2 for any identity id, B can compute the private key
for identity id using the trapdoor mskabo, then runs the algorithm Invabo and
responds the adversary. Challenge phase is implemented just as in both games.
It is easy to see that the distinguisher B perfectly simulates game G4 or game
G5 depending on whethermpkLF results in an injective or lossy function (respec-
tively). By the indistinguishability of injective and lossy functions of IB-LTDF,
the claim holds.
Claim 9. Game G5 and game G6 are 3ε-close.
Proof.We proceed via two sub-games G5,1,G5,2. In sub-game G5,1, we modify
the challenge ciphertext of game G5 so that h
∗ ← Htcr(m∗), c∗1 ← LF.Eval
(mpkLF, id,m
∗), c∗2
$←− Rabo. The sub-game G5,2 is identical to sub-game G5,1
except that c∗1
$←− RLF. Blow we will show that game G5 and sub-game G5,1,
sub-game G5,1 and sub-game G5,2, sub-game G5,2 and game G6 are statistically
indistinguishable respectively.
In game G5, let X = m and Z = h
∗‖c∗1, then we have |Z| ≤ 2rtcr+rLF due to
the universal TCR hash function Htcr and the IB-LTDF with the lossy mode.
By the hypothesis that t ≥ rLF + rabo+ rtcr +2 log( 1ǫ ) and Chain Rule, we have
H˜∞(X|Z) = H˜∞(m∗|h∗‖c∗1) ≥ rabo +2 log( 1ǫ ), generalized LHL shows that c∗2 is
ε-close to uniform on the range of Πabo given h
∗‖c∗1. That is to say, G5 and sub-
game G5,1 are ε-close. Similarly, in sub-game G5,1, we take X = m and Z = h
∗.
According to the Chain Rule and the Generalized LHL, we can show that c∗1 is
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ε-close to uniform on the range RLF. In sub-game G5,2, we take X = m, and
according to the standard LHL (i.e., the Generalized LHL with empty Z), we
can conclude that h∗ is ε-close to uniform on its range as well. The claim holds.
Claim 10. In game G6, adversary has no advantage to win the game.
Proof. Obviously, when executed in game G6, h
∗, c∗1 and c
∗
2 are chosen uni-
formly and independent of all other variables, including b. It is easy to see that
the adversary has no advantage in the game. This claim follows.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a notion of identity-based all-but-one trapdoor
functions, which is an extension of all-but-one trapdoor functions in the identity-
based setting. Based on the Bellare et al.’s identity-based lossy trapdoor func-
tions [Bellare et al. 2012], we gave a concrete construction of IB-ABO-TDF and
proved its security under DLIN assumption. Based on an IB-LTDF and our IB-
ABO-TDF, we proposed a CCA-secure deterministic IBE scheme in the selective-
id attack model. A future direction is to construct CCA-secure DIBE scheme in
the adaptive case.
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